Taking its cue from the medical fi eld, psychology has long been curious about the rela onship between biological sex and illness just as socie es have long been interested in regula ng women's bodies. From 19 th Century gender diff erences scholarship through 20 th century ac vism this ar cle introduces the gendered history of psychology and health. Off ering a general overview of the past and more recent feminist present within a North American framework. Taking as its base founda on the intellectual shi s away from an exclusively individualis c lens towards one that now emphasizes systems and society; referred to as the diff erence between a "women-as-problem" and a "women-in-context" approach. Topics addressed include early gender diff erences scholarship, mental health costs and gendered violence; dual impact of the paradigms of masculinity, perversity in medica ng and trea ng a woman's psychological condi on which result from living in a patriarchal socie es; constructs of female sexual dysfunc on, and more. We encourage South American scholars to take up the call to more thoroughly explore and expand on the histories of gendered health and psychology within regional and historical me sensi ve contexts. Keywords: history, health, psychology, feminism, gender
Freud listens to the troubled young woman, considers, then gives his verdict. He can tell her the cause of her illness, if she follows his instruc ons she can be well again.
Although psychoanalysis is no longer psychology's reigning therapeu c approach, its tradi onal gendered rela onship between male scien fi c expert and female pa ent remains alive; if subliminal, dynamic in psychological thinking about health and illness (Marecek & Hare-Mus n, 1991) . Taking its cue from the medical fi eld, from its beginnings, psychology has been curious about the rela onship between biological sex and illness, asking ques ons such as: Is one sex more prone to mental or physical illness? If so, what factor accounts for such a diff erence? Is it nature? Nurture?
The answers given to these ques ons have varied widely, depending on who is answering, either in their area of exper se and/or their historical context. This ar cle will introduce the history of psychology of health and gender, exploring both, the fi eld's past and its current state. This history will be primarily North American in focus; we hope this ar cle will inspire South American scholars to explore what the history of this topic looks like in their own home country or region.
Nineteenth Century Scholarship on Gender Diff erences
Discussions of gender diff erences in health within North American academic psychology really got their start in the late nineteenth century, when women began to be allowed to pursue higher educa on. Women entering the discipline of psychology were struck by their male professors and colleagues' assump ons about the female body and psyche (Rutherford & Granek, 2010) . At the me women were thought to be more fragile, easily exhausted by mental, as well as physical labor. Many academics harbored doubts about the wisdom of women pursuing higher educa on for this reason-it was thought that study might permanently damage the female body, possibly even resul ng in infer lity (Diehl, 1986) . Func onal periodicity, a common view, held that women experienced debilita ng emo onal and physical eff ects during menstrua on, making women inferior, unreliable workers. When psychologists discussed psychological gender diff erences, they tended to simply import cultural stereotypes, for example, when discussing the emo onality of men and women (Shields, 2007) .
Many psychologists also embraced the variability hypothesis, the view that men varied more broadly than women on any given trait, thanks to evolu on. On this view there were both more male 'geniuses' and male 'imbeciles', and more women of average intelligence, for example (Shields, 1975 (Shields, , 1982 . This theory had the advantage of jus fying the status quo-with the variability hypothesis social inequality between the sexes was understood as the result of natural diff erences, not discrimina on.
Such views struck the fi rst genera on women in psychology as convenient, and a number took ac on, using their research programs to put such claims to the test. Mary Whiton Calkins used the female students of Wellesley College to test the variability hypothesis (Nevers & Calkins, 1895) ; Helen Thompson Woolley wrote her disserta on on The Mental Traits of Sex (Thompson, 1903) , and Leta Ste er Hollingworth tested both, the variability hypothesis (Hollingworth, 1914b) and func onal periodicity (Hollingworth, 1914a) . This research tended to be much more careful and cri cal than the research it was responding to. Woolley summed up the exis ng fi eld of psychology of sex in the following terms:
There is perhaps no other fi eld aspiring to be scien fi c where fl agrant personal bias, logic martyred in the cause of suppor ng a prejudice, unfounded asser ons, and even sen mental rot and drivel, have run riot to such an extent as here. (Woolley, 1910, pp. 340-341) Woolley and her peers also tended to emphasize the confounding infl uence of the social environment on women's psychological traits, something other researchers ignored (Sheilds, 1975b) . This was par cularly relevant given how sharply curtailed Victorian women's social roles were. As psychologist, Amy Tanner, expressed the problem in 1896, "The real tendencies of women cannot be known un l they are free to choose, any more than those of a ed-up dog can be" (Pe t, 2008, p. 150) . Despite the merits of these women's research, the mainstream response was dismissive, and psychology of sex con nued to embrace the variability hypothesis and func onal periodicity well into the 20 th Century. Woman as the weaker, sicker, and more emo onally vola le sex was to be a persistent idea in psychology.
th Century Scholarship and Ac vism
Although there were occasional discussions of the psychological characteris cs of men and women (see Bryan & Boring, 1944 , 1946 , 1947 Boring, 1951 for a varia on on the variability hypothesis and Seward, 1944 Seward, , 1946 for another review of diff erences emphasizing social infl uences), it was not un l the 1960s and 1970s, with advent of the feminist and women's libera on movements, that psychology seriously revisited the issue of gender. In 1963 Be y Friedan's The Feminine Mys que sparked widespread discussion about women's social role. The book had psychological implica ons, since Friedan's thesis was that the neuroses of many housewives were the result of their restricted intellectual and social ac vi es-there was nothing wrong with them that meaningful work and social equality couldn't cure. Phyllis Chesler's book Women and Madness (1972) raised similar issues regarding psychiatry and psychology, poin ng out the illogical and sexist nature of many of the clinical interpreta ons of women's mental illness. Women were pathologized, both, for not suffi ciently conforming to feminine norms and for being too feminine-the default assump on was female illness (see also Marecek & Hare-Mus n, 1991 ).
Feminism's mantra "The personal is poli cal" meant that within psychology the experiences of everyday women were embraced as a legi mate source of knowledge (Kim & Rutherford, 2015) . Inspired by such personal knowledge, feminist psychologists tackled some of the fi eld's most obvious problems, such as the sexual rela onships between counselors and clients (Hare-Mus n, 1974) . Their eff orts led to the crea on of American Psychological Associa on's Task Force on Sex Bias and Sex Role Stereotyping in Psychotherapeu c Prac ce, and, a er much resistance, a prohibi on on sex between therapists and clients (Kim & Rutherford, 2015) . Similarly, feminist psychologists and sociologists helped to reconceptulize concepts like rape as symptoms of a patriarchal society, rather than as the result of individualis c pathology (Brownmiller, 1975; Russell, 1975) and have consistently ba led theories of rape as sociobiological determinism (Sunday & Tobach, 1985; Travis, 2003) . This blend of ac vism and research fi ts well into the feminist concept of consciousness-raising-age-old, familiar problems took on new signifi cance as telling symptoms of a larger pa ern of patriarchal oppression. Even though, is not to say that it has been or is always a harmonious coupling (see Rutherford & Pe t, 2015) .
The increasing theore cal sophis ca on of the feminist movement soon led feminist psychologists to ques on the objec vity of the scien fi c project itself. Naomi Weisstein's 1968 paper "Psychology Constructs the Female" pointed out various forms of experimenter bias, and cri qued psychology for being too focused on internal factors (traits) to the exclusion of external factors (social context) (Weisstein, 1971; Rutherford, Vaughn-Blount, & Ball, 2010) . As a result, Weisstein argued, psychology could not legi mately claim to know anything about the experience of the female-the claims of male psychologists were nothing but "fantasy." Others have cri qued psychology for its failure to use female subjects (in both human and animal research) (Beery & Zucker, 2011; Carlson & Carlson, 1961; Dan & Beekman, 1972) , for the dominance of men at every level of the experimental and publica on process (Rix, 1990; Walker, 1991) , and the bias inherent in masculine approaches to science (Keller, 1985 (Keller, /1995 Rutherford, 2015; Sherif, 1998) .
Such cri ques raise the possibility that minor adjustments to psychology's methods might be insuffi cient to address the epistemological challenges raised by feminism, and a completely diff erent approach to science might be necessary. Three dis nct feminist approaches to bias in psychology resulted: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint science, and postmodern feminism (Harding, 1986; Riger, 1992) . Feminist empiricism has most in common with mainstream posi vis c psychology, advoca ng for a stricter conformity to rigorious scien fi c methods to eliminate bias. Although, some changes need to be made to these methods to address sexist assump ons, feminist empiricism is op mis c about science as a means to accurate knowledge. In contrast, the feminist standpoint approach emphasizes the forma ve nature of the iden ty of the researcher, and therefore, argues that women must develop uniquely new paradigms and models to adequately describe female experience. The best known example of this approach is Carol Gilligan's research on women's moral development (Gilligan, 1982) , which rejected the categories of Kohlberg's moral theory as inadequate. Finally, the postmodern feminist approach holds that objec vity in science is impossible, and instead, emphasizes the role of power in the crea on of knowledge. Although, these three feminist approaches are incompa ble in many of their specifi c recommenda ons, they hold in common the view that scien sts ought to prac ce refl exivity, becoming aware of their biases, and cri cal of their methodological decisions.
Such cau on is par cularly necessary in research on psychology of women, given its 19 th Century roots in research on individual diff erences. Ini ally, as we have seen, researches focused solely on comparing men and women, and assumed the existence of substan al diff erences between the sexes. However, in conjunc on with the growth of feminism, the psychology of women was reborn with a more cri cal approach (the fi rst psychology of women textbook [Bardwick, 1971] was published in 1971). In 1974, Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin, published an extensive review of sex diff erences research which found very li le evidence for sex diff erences (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974) . In fact, these diff erences research review, which covered more than 1,400 studies, probably underes mated the number of studies which found gender similari es, given the lack of incen ve to publish such mundane fi ndings (Unger, 1979) . That same year Sandra Bem off ered an alterna ve to psychological personality tests which measured subjects' masculinity and femininity (Bem, 1974) . The Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) moved away from conceptualizing masculinity and femininity as opposite ends of a con nuum; adding androgynous traits to the inventory in addi on to masculine and feminine a ributes. Rhoda Unger's "Toward a Redefi ni on of Sex and Gender in Psychology" (1979) provided another cri que of diff erences research. In this ar cle Unger dis nguished between sex and gender, defi ning sex as an inborn, biological variable, and gender as the result of social construc on; and pointed out the degree to which the two had been confl ated in most psychological research. Unger argued that dis nguishing between sex and gender in research would help to keep researchers from confl a ng gender and sex diff erences and help make clear that the diff erences between men and women result from a combina on of physiological, biosocial, and environmental factors. Unger (1979) also pointed out the ul mate fruitlessness of much sex diff erences research: "When an assumed sex diff erence is inves gated and found to be nonexistent, the argument simply shi s to another ground" (p. 1087). Following Unger, psychology of women researchers have adopted the sex vs. gender conven on and have a empted to move beyond diff erences research.
The Health Impact of Gender and Sexism
Rather than star ng with the assump on of sex diff erences, modern feminist research tends to start the assump on that patriarchal and sexist systems impact the psychological and physical wellbeing of, both, male and females. Rather than simply focusing on the defi cits of women and the advantages of men in patriarchal socie es, this approach also highlights women's strengths and men's defi cits. For example, although men are the fi nancial winners in a patriarchal system, which one might expect to lead to health benefi ts, men's restricted emo onal expression due to gender norms may have serious health costs (Wong, Pituch, & Rochlen, 2006) . Similarly, although women are at higher risk in a number of domains due to their sex, they o en demonstrate unexpected resiliency, thanks to some of the psychologically healthy avenues for coping open to them in a patriarchal society (e.g. Fallon & Jome, 2007) . In other words, the impact of gender on health is expected to be complex and very context dependent.
Perhaps one of the most pervasive costs to being a woman is her signifi cantly higher risk for gendered violence, such as sexual harassment, domes c violence, sexual abuse, rape, and even murder by a roman c partner (Koss et al., 1994) . This gendered violence comes with a high physical and psychological cost, for example PTSD a er rape is common (Rothbaum, Foa, Riggs, Murdock, & Walsh, 1992) , as is physical illness due to the emo onal trauma of persistent partner abuse (Follingstand, Brennan, Hause, Polek, & Rutledge, 1991) . The concept of rape culture describes patriarchal power systems and the processes of socializa on that leads to men feel en tled to exert their dominance over women's bodies, and to use violence in that process (see Holmstrom & Burgess, 1983; Rutherford, 2011; Ullman, 2010) .
The existence of rape culture also helps to explain the complexity of women's psychological responses to violence. Women may prac ce denial about the violence they experienced, perhaps because they are resistant to disempowering themselves by iden fying themselves as a vic m; perhaps because they desire to remain in rela onship with the perpetrator; perhaps because they receive external pressure to do so (from the perpetrator or society at large; see Jonzon & Lindblad, 2004 and Staller & Nelson-Gardell, 2005 on the hazards children and adolecents face in disclosing sexual abuse). As a result, many women internalize the violence, blaming themselves or their ac ons for their abuse. This response to trauma can result in depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, and learned helplessness. Since society does not validate the experience of vic ms of violence, but instead tends to abet and sanc on male aggression, women are vulnerable to "gasligh ng"-being told that the violence never occurred-which can lead them to doubt their judgment experience of reality (Rush, 1996; Benjamin, 1996) .
The emo onal costs associated with gendered violence may begin to explain the fact that women are at a signifi cantly higher risk of depression than men (Kessler, 2003) . In fact, women experience higher rates of a wide range of mental illnesses, including, in addi on to depression (Kessler et al., 1994) , anxiety disorders and ea ng disorders (Peat & Muehlenkamp, 2011) , and personality disorders (Landrine, 1989) . Women also a empt suicide at three mes the rate of men (Centers for Disease Control and Preven on, 2014). Explana ons for women's greater emo onal distress have ranged from the biological (hormones), to the psychological (social roles which both put women at greater risk for trauma and allow expression of distress; cogni ve styles such as learned helplessness and rumina on) to the societal (violence, economic inequality).
Postpartum depression, premenstrual syndrome, and premenstrual dysphoric disorder are disorders par cular to women which have received signifi cant a en on in research within psychology of women. Although these were tradi onally been accepted as hormonal in origin, feminist scholars have pointed out the vague defi ni ons of the disorders (Chrisler, 2000 (Chrisler, /2004 and off ered compe ng or complimentary societal explana ons (Abrams & Curran, 2009; Caplan, McCurdy-Myers, & Gans, 1992; Chrisler, Johnston, Champagne, & Preston, 1994; Held & Rutherford, 2012; Johnston Robledo, 2000) . In this view, women experience distress prior to menstrua on or a er birth. In large part because of the societal pressures, for example, new mothers experience depression, both, because of expecta ons they will be overjoyed at the new baby and because of the lack of social support post-birth in most western households. Therapists opera ng from a feminist perspec ve tend to respond to women's psychological struggles by focusing on the social context, a emp ng to raise their client's awareness of the power of oppressive systems in their life, while at the same me, respec ng the client's perspec ve on their life. A similar perspec ve, but aimed at explaining the psychology of men is gender role strain paradigm (GRSP), an concept introduced in Joseph Pleck's The Myth of Masculinity (1981) . Gender role strain paradigm suggests that many of the pathologies typical to men have their origin in a strong and highly limi ng gender paradigm that prescribes what it means to be masculine. Strain occurs when these norms are violated, which prompts the man involved to assert his masculinity through stereotypical, usually harmful means (Levant, 2011) . Using the sex/gender dis nc on advocated by Unger (1979) , GRSP views masculinity as something socially constructed and varying over me and in diff erent cultures. This introduces a certain op mism into the picture-although, masculinity in the West has tradi onally been associated with psychologically harmful traits such as dominance and aggression, masculinity is malleable and could be altered to include a more heathy balance of characteris cs.
However, despite this theore cal fl exibility, paradigms of masculinity in the present day remain powerful. In fact, due to rapid societal moves toward gender equality have contributed to a crisis of masculinity, the confusion and insecurity many men feel about their masculinity has resulted increased pressure to follow stereotypically masculine scripts (Levant, 1997) . This has resulted in resistance to feminist cri ques, and even the rise of an -feminist and openly misogynis c groups (Levant, 2011) . It is not only women who are harmed by these behaviors; men's health is aff ected by their adherence to masculine scripts requiring restricted emo onal expression, self-suffi ciency and detachment from rela onships, professional achievement, toughness to the extent of indiff erence to their own health needs, and a wiliness to resort to aggression and violence. Men are at greater risk of a wide range of nega ve behaviors (Brooks & Silverstein, 1995) ; they are more likely to be "parents estranged from their children; the homeless; substance abusers; perpetrators of violence; prisoners; sex addicts and sex off enders; vic ms of homicide, suicide, war, and fatal automobile accidents; and fatal vic ms of lifestyle-and stress-related illnesses" (Levant, 2011, p. 766) .
A central concept in GRSP is alexithymia, which describes the condi on of lacking the vocabulary to describe emo ons. The Norma ve Male Alexithymia Hypothesis (NMA) suggests that alexithymia is the normal result of gendered socializa on (Levant, 1992) . Alexithymia results when gendered socializa on places pressure on boys to suppress their emo ons, rewarding masculine displays of toughness or "masculine" emo ons (such as anger), and punishing the expression of vulnerability or stereotypically feminine emo ons. As a result, boys do not develop vocabulary to describe their emo onal states. When paired with a similar female socializa on which, in contrast, encourages the explora on and expression of emo on, the results of tradi onal gendered socializa on reinforces the percep on that men are naturally less emo onal than women.
However, the tradi onal masculine ideology of extreme diff erences between the sexes is damaging to all concerned. Although, such an ideology benefi ts men by keeping them in a privileged posi on rela ve to women; and men who belong to racial and sexual minori es, there are also health costs for all par es. Men who cannot measure up to cultural norms for masculinity experience distress and anxiety, and even men who successfully conform to the norms can experience alexithymia, which impacts their healthy coping and communica on about their emo onal life (Sánchez, Greenberg, Liu, & Vilain, 2009) . Such restric on of emo onal vocabulary can mean that men's resilience in the face of trauma c or stressful events is signifi cantly aff ected-rather than being able to seek emo onal relief through healthy outlets (such as seeking rela onal support, or giving voice to their feelings), men with alexithymia may resort to aggression, violence, substance abuse or other forms of toxic masculinity.
Research from the GRSP perspec ve has resulted in a number of useful scales, such as the Male Role Norms Inventory-Revised (MRNI-R) (Levant & Richmond, 2008) and the Norma ve Male Alexithymia Scale (Levant et al., 2006) to assess an individual's conformity to tradi onal masculine norms and his level of alexithymia. Studies have found that adhering to tradi onal masculinity ideology is correlated with higher levels of alexithymia (Levant, et , 2003) , and that that NMA can be reduced with an educa onal program (Levant, Majors, & Kelley, 1998; Levant, Halter, Hayden, & Williams, 2009 ). In general GRSP appears to off er a helpful perspec ve on masculinity, allowing for acknowledgement of both, the privilege, but also, the costs of being male. Although, we have men oned women's greater emo onal expressiveness as a strength rela ve to men, one implica on of the restricted emo onal expression in men is the dispropor onate share of emo onal labor that falls to women. Women's nurturing role in heterosexual rela onship is, perhaps, the most obvious example of this. Women off er listening, counsel, emo onal support, and affi rma on for their male partners as a ma er of course, and o en without receiving the same level of care in return (Bartkey, 2002; Daniels, 1987; Erickson, 2005) . In their paren ng role, too, women tend to do greater emo onal work in addi on to regular caregiving and household chores. Women also experience the expecta on to provide unpaid emo onal labor in their workplace, and are frequently found in greater numbers in caretaking jobs or jobs which emo onal labor is built into job performance expecta ons, such as waitressing or other service jobs (see Hochschild, 1983 ). This dynamic is a source of economic injus ce-emo onal labor is an undervalued en ty, jobs which require signifi cant emo onal labor are o en generally poorly compensated, and women generally do much unpaid emo onal work even in higher status jobs, such as university professor (see Bartkey, 2002; Wharton, 2009) .
Such emo onal exploita on is reinforced, both, by early socializa on of girls to adopt a suppor ve role, and the economic and rela onal costs to women who refuse to engage in nonreciprocal emo onal labor. Besides these costs, there is likely a signifi cant psychological cost involved in constantly taking another perspec ve and suppressing one's own emo ons about a situa on. This, it has been theorized, may lead to a loss of iden ty separate from another and a loss of ability to trust one's own percep on of reality (Wharton, 2009) . The silencing that occurs as a result of women's constant taking on of masculine perspec ve no doubt contributes to their acceptance of sexist situa ons or rela onships. Adop ng the concept introduced by W. E. B. Du Bois to describe the black experience, feminists have referred to the situa on of women who must maintain her own perspec ve and yet learn to func on in a masculine world as double consciousness (see Carter-Sowell & Zimmerman, 2015) . Double consciousness is likely psychological forma ve, making it diffi cult for women who spend their life taking on a male perspec ve to speak and be asser ve, even when not doing so, has severe consequences for their wellbeing.
Recent Developments and Debates
In recent years, one approach to the psychological complaints of women has been to off er new diagnos c categories and medica ons to address the complaints. While this approach makes sense from a posi vis c approach, to psychology that is focused on internal psychological factors, this approach has been cri qued by feminist psychologists. Part of the cri que comes from a more general cri que of the overmedicaliza on of normal psychological states and the prolifera on of diagnos c categories in the Diagnos c and Sta s cal Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (Greenberg, 2013 feminist perspec ve, there is an extra level of perversity in medica ng, or otherwise, trea ng a woman's psychological condi on which has resulted from simply living in a patriarchal society (e.g. see McHugh, 2006; Liebert, Leve, & Hui, 2011) . A recent example of this sort of problema c expansion of pathologies is the 2015 FDA approval of the drug Addyi, popularly known as "female Viagra" to treat inhibited female sexual desire, a condi on described by a new diagnos c category in the DSM-5, female sexual interest/arousal disorder. The trials of Addyi showed only a modest eff ect on sexual responsiveness, as well as some serious side eff ects (Nagoski, 2015) . Feminists raised ques ons about the degree to which this was in fact a medical issue, sugges ng that women might be encouraged to take a powerful drug for a problem that was in reality social or rela onal in nature (see Kaschak & Tiefer, 2001; Tiefer, 2001 Tiefer, , 2010 Teifer, Tavris, & Hall, 2002) .
A feminist interpreta on of female sexual dysfunc on starts with the dynamic of gender inequality, which might result in sexual frustra on in myriad ways-because of a male partner's selfi shness or ignorance about female pleasure,and also,the greater female share of household du es and emo onal labor which might result in exhaus on or confl ict with a partner, etc. Further, it may be that women's sexual drives were not in fact defec ve, but only seem so given a comparison with a male standard of sexuality or pressure from partners with interest in more frequent sexual ac vity (Bancro , 2002; Wood, Koch, & Mansfi eld, 2006) . By ignoring these issues, the makers of the drug in fact, ignored the unique characteris cs of female sexuality, and simply used a model that have worked for men, despite the known diff erences between male and female sexuality. Given the strong profi tability of drugs like Addyi, however, there seems to be a small chance that drug companies and other stakeholders will stop off ering exclusively biological solu ons to women's (perceived) health problems.
A more posi ve recent development has been the expansion of psychology of women to include the concept of intersec onality. Intersec onality emphasizes the complexity of iden ty with the idea that an individual's mul ple iden es aff ect each other-making their eff ect mul plica ve rather than addi ve. This means, for example, that a black woman experiences a very diff erent variety of sexism than does a white woman; or racism than does a black man. Implicit in the concept of intersec onality is a cri que of the limited perspec ve of second wave feminism-the leaders of the women's libera on movement tended to be white, and o en saw race as a separate issue, rather than looking at the role of power holis cally (Moraga & Anzaldúa, 1981 Hooks, 1981) . However, intersec onality is one of the core concepts of third wave feminism, and holds much promise for future research on gender and health.
From an intersec onality perspec ve, discussing what kind of impact gender has on health is simply too broad-instead, one must look at the impact on a par cular minority or subgroup of women. A similar cri que has been made about class: much feminist scholarship has focused on the problems of upper and middle class women, and ignored the issues unique to poor women (Reid, 1993) . Following the cri que of psychology's research subjects as WEIRD (from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Developed countries) (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) , present day psychology of gender a empts to locate its claims about men and women and to expand its research base beyond western universi es. Findings on the experiences of gender from other cultures are seen to be enlightening and theore cally frui ul.
An important element of this shi away from exclusively western perspec ves on women has been a move away from exclusively individualis c lens towards one that emphasizes systems and society. This has been referred to the diff erence between a "women-as-problem" and a "women-in-context" approach (Rutherford, Marecek, & Sheese, 2012; Crawford & Marecek, 1989) . A "women-as-problem" approach emphasizes the various psychological defi cits of women rela ve to men. Although, it does not see these as natural defi cits but the result of sexist socializa on, it nonetheless locates the problem as internal to the woman, and proposes solu ons that target women's traits or behaviors. In contrast, a "womenin-context" approach looks to the social context for clues as to why a par cular behavior might be an adap ve response, given ins tu onalized sexism. This approach suggests a more radical solu on to gender dispari es in health-psychologists should look to dismantle systemic sexism in their work.
Interes ngly, the words "woman" and "problem" have been regularly paired. From the use of "The Woman Problem" to describe the late 19 th Century discussion of women's proper role in society, to E. G. Boring's use of the term to describe the lack of eminent women in psychology (Boring, 1951) , to Be y Friedan's descrip on of suburban feminine malaise as the "problem that has no name," women have been seen as uniquely problema c. With the benefi t of more than a century of discussion of the psychology of gender, however, we have been able to see that the problem lies elsewhere-not in a woman's sick body or fragile psyche, but in society's views of her, in the power structures that benefi t from the weakness and oppression of others.
